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ABSTRACT
Attracting investors and generating funding is a key issue for all start-ups. The information asymmetries
between investor and start-up need to be reduced. Despite the overwhelming literature on venture capital
financing and different signals reflecting venture quality, pinpointing the signals which impact funding
decisions remains an open issue. This study presents an empirical examination of the effectiveness of
different signals to convince investors and generate funding. We examine the impact of signals concerning
venture quality (classic ones such as human capital, intellectual capital and social alliance/network capital
as well as the strategic orientation in terms of business model patterns. Based on a comprehensive sample
of more than 101 German FinTechs, our study delivers empirical evidence that human capital as well as
the strategic orientation positively impacts a FinTech’s attractiveness. However, our chosen measures for
intellectual capital and social network/alliance capital result in negative effects.
Keywords: Alliance capital, Intellectual capital, human capital, Strategic Orientation, FinTechs, Funding
JEL Codes: M13, G24, L26

I.
Introduction
According to Burgmaier and Hüthig (2015), the FinTech market will undergo a
major cleanup process, considering that a lot of start-ups offer the same services, and
many will neither survive the necessary selection process nor reach a global presence.
This assessment of the future development of the FinTech revolution in the financial
market is accompanied by a problem that confronts different market players as well as
other external stakeholders: How can successful FinTech start-ups be identified that will
be able to establish a permanent position in the market and therefore, represent a suitable
investment object? Investors in all markets seek for attractive investment opportunities,
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therefore we analyze the German FinTech market and the financing capacity of the
different FinTechs.
The German market is of particular interest as Germany has one of the strongest
financial industries in Europe after the UK. Furthermore, FinTech activity is increasing
and there is an increasing number of start-ups, all of which are looking for investors
sooner or later (Stuckenborg et al., 2017).
In the last years, there has been a steeply growing number of start-ups, which are
trying to enter the market for financial services. These FinTech start-ups or just FinTechs
(FinTech as a term consisting of “finance” and “technology”) enter the market,
confronting traditional players such as banks and insurance companies with innovative
services (Dapp, 2014; Gulamhuseinwala et al. 2015). These young ventures focus on
different areas of activity and try to fill different stages of the financial value chain
(Stuckenborg et al., 2017). Comparing the FinTech development on an international
level, it is noted that Great Britain (London in particular) is one of the biggest hot spots
for these young firms. Nevertheless, when taking into account investment volumes, the
FinTech development in Germany has also grown considerably in recent years (Ernst &
Young, 2016).
This FinTech phenomenon is not only of high relevance for well-established
companies in the financial sector, but also for external stakeholders such as investors or
researchers – particularly evident in the increasing number of publications in this
domain. Corresponding with the growing number of FinTechs, the share of companies
that have given up their business activities increases equally. According to Song et al.
(2008), within the area of technology start-ups, only 36% of these young companies still
exist after four years from the date of company foundation. Due to the large number of
newly founded start-ups and the increasing growth rates in the FinTech market, it is
particularly relevant to identify those FinTechs that are successful and that will survive
permanently in their respective markets. However, this prediction or separation of
successful FinTechs is equally difficult for all external stakeholders. In order to separate
and identify exactly the group of FinTechs with the prospect of promising success, it is
necessary to identify certain characteristics or critical success factors which are likely to
lead to a long-term market existence (see e.g. Nicoletti, 2017; Roure & Maidique, 1986).
In research, different methods are used to investigate signals or critical success
factors. Besides qualitative research designs such (semi-structured) interviews (Roure &
Maidique, 1986; Werth et al., 2019), there are randomized field experiments (Bernstein
et al., 2017), or more quantitative designs that apply different econometric models such
as different types of regression analyses (Ahlers et al., 2015; Baum & Silverman, 2004;
Colombo & Grilli, 2010).
Several studies investigate the effect of financial sources on different success
indicators for start-ups, including the survival rate (e.g. Cassar, 2004; Colombo & Grilli,
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2010; Shane & Stuart, 2002). Drover et al. (2017) provide a literature review of
entrepreneurial financing research and also give directions and recommendations for
further research in this area. Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003), for instance, analyzed the
effect of received bank loans on the survival prospects of start-ups and found a
significant relationship. Therefore, it may be said that gaining capital in the early stages
of start-up development is one of the most important aspects for young ventures.
Generally, start-ups can rely on different financing sources including, for example, the
initial capital provided by the founders themselves; financial resources of family and
friends or outside capital (Au et al, 2016; Colombo & Grilli, 2010). Against the backdrop
of limited resources of founders, start-ups frequently depend on external capital
(Thornton-Trump & Fu, 2000). While large companies can rely on classical sources like
bank loans, such types of financing are associated with high costs for nascent businesses
due to their uncertain future prospects and high risk of failure (Gregory et al., 2005).
Thus, one recurrent capital source in the start-up environment is private investment or
venture capital. In previous research, studies have evaluated attributes of young firms
which are more likely to be attractive for external investors. For instance, Islam et al.
(2018) focus on government grants and their effect on further financing rounds.
We aim to analyze the financing capacity of FinTechs in Germany. Therefore,
we see the quality of the venture as a key driver of the financing capacity. By analyzing
the various signals of venture quality, we want to find out which factors and
characteristics of a Fintech lead to its ability to attract investors and thus to acquire capital
for further development. These signals may be evaluated in the context of signaling
theory, which is often employed in entrepreneurship literature. Thereby, we rely on the
human, social alliance/network, intellectual capital and the strategic orientation of startups and investigate different variables of these dimensions in accordance with their
financing capacity. We contribute to existing research by transferring proven approaches
to the German FinTech market and by also applying an empirical approach that
complements current qualitative research. Furthermore, we introduce a new dimension
of venture quality.
There appears to be a sizable lack of research focus that considers such a wide
range of start-up characteristics and its association with the financing capacity. In order
to close this gap in literature, the following research questions will be answered within
the framework of our paper:
1. Which signals can be used to assess the quality of a FinTech with regards to the financing
capacity, i.e. the funding success?
2. Which characteristics of FinTechs seem to be attractive from the view of external investors?
3. What is the impact of strategic decisions, such as chosen business models and areas of activity,
on the financing capacity, i.e. funding success of FinTechs?
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section two we outline
the theoretical background regarding start-ups and present different signals of FinTechs.
Section three presents the methodology of the data collection and the analysis carried
out. Section four illustrates the findings and in section five we discuss the results of our
research, explain its limitations and point out further research opportunities. The last
section contains the final conclusion.
II.

Theoretical Background and Hypothesis

A.
Signaling Theory
Basically, investors must decide whether to invest in a FinTech or not. However,
there exists an information asymmetry between both of them. As a rule, investors do not
know all the details and find it difficult to assess the intentions of the FinTech and its
management. On the one hand they do not know about some characteristics, such as
exact details of the business idea, and on the other hand they cannot exactly assess the
motivation and abilities of the founders, management and employees. In this respect,
they must rely on the information they receive from the FinTech itself. The challenge
for investors is therefore to evaluate both the quality and the prospects with the available
information. Thus, investors are forced to make a decision with incomplete information
and uncertainty (Baum & Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). Ultimately the investment
opportunity is a further example of the market for ‘lemons’ problem (Akerlof, 1970).
One way to overcome or to reduce the information asymmetries are signals. However,
effective signals need to fulfill the following criteria: they must be costly and observable
(Spence, 1973, 1974). A signal serves as a proxy for a characteristic or an ability and must
therefore have corresponding correlation with the characteristic or the ability.
In the context of nascent businesses, signaling plays an important rule for all
types of financing. Investors need to evaluate businesses in a very early stage that might
only have ideas about what they want to implement. A business in this stage often only
consists of a team and a business idea, sometimes with an already developed prototype.
Financial data and key figures are often not available or have minor informative value.
Large market studies or market assessments are also not available, meaning those
investors, especially in early stages, need to rely on different signals as well as attributes
of the FinTech that can help to evaluate a particular investment opportunity.
The topic of signals is largely elaborated in literature and many different signals
have been analyzed regarding their effect on funding decisions (e.g. Ahlers et al., 2015;
Backes-Gellner & Werner, 2007; Colombo et al., 2018; Hoenig & Henkel, 2015; Islam
et al., 2018; Ko & McKelvie, 2018; Weiss, 1995). Connelly et al. (2011) provide a
literature review on signaling theory.
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B.
Quality Signals for FinTechs
In order to analyze the attractiveness of German FinTechs we develop a model
to show the relation between the dependent variable “financing capacity”, which we use
as an indicator of attractiveness, and the independent variables. We argue that basically
the quality of the FinTech influences the ability to acquire funding from investors (see
figure 1). We follow Baum and Silverman (2004) and Ahlers et al. (2015) who argue that
venture quality can be signaled by human, social (alliance) and intellectual capital. In
addition, we argue that the strategic orientation, i.e. the business model pattern, is also a
quality signal, since it indicates how the FinTech aims to earn money.

Figure 1. Determinants of FinTechs' Financing Capacity.

Venture Quality
H1:

Human Capital

H2:

Social Network/
Alliance Capital
Intellectual
Capital

H3:

Strategic
Orientation

H4:

FinTech financing
capacity

exploratively

1.

Human Capital

Human capital is an important signal that can affect funding success. Numerous
studies in academic literature analyzed the relationship and the impact on funding
success. In the early stage of a company, the people and the team behind it are one of
the most important aspects. This is claimed by business press (Byrne, 2000) and also
analyzed by academic research. Recent studies evaluate the relationship between human
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capital and the ability to generate funding or to acquire resources. Roure and Maidique
(1986) show in their study the importance of the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and
the founding team, especially previous experience in high growth ventures and also
completeness of relevant functions in the team. Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) evaluate
that skills and experience of the team are relevant selection criteria that are also frequently
used by venture capitalists.
Recently, different studies haven proven a relationship between the success of
the company and human capital (Ahlers et al., 2015; Almus & Nerlinger, 1999; Bates &
Bradford, 1992; Baum & Silverman, 2004; Bernstein et al., 2017; Bollazzi et al., 2018;
Colombo et al., 2004; Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Ismail & Medhat, 2019; Unger et al.,
2011). Although, studies have indicated that human capital has an impact, they differ in
terms of relative importance of human capital (Ahlers et al., 2015). For entrepreneurs it
is of great importance to identify and also exploit new business opportunities (Shane &
Venkataraman, 2000). Burton et al. (2002) show that previous employers of the founding
team also impact the chance of receiving funds in early stages. These examples show that
human capital can have different facets and elements.
Consequentially, the question arises on how human capital can be assessed by
potential investors. Usually, venture capitalists perform a thorough due diligence, where
they also evaluate the human capital. In face-to-face meetings they can get to know the
founders and the management team. Whilst in research it is difficult to reflect personal
impressions, there are characteristics that can serve as proxies for human capital.
Education, especially in terms of university degrees, is a good indicator for
human capital (Backes-Gellner & Werner, 2007; Bollazzi et al., 2018; Hsu, 2007; Levie
& Gimmon, 2008). University degrees also fulfil the signal criteria of Spence (1973), since
they are costly and also measurable. Work experience also serves as a predictor of human
capital and is an indicator for measuring the quality of applicants (Turban & Cable, 2003).
Hypothesis 1: FinTechs with more human capital (i.e. more work experience,
higher education and more founders) are likely to have a larger financing capacity.
2.

Intellectual Capital

Innovative ideas and innovations are important factors for companies in general
(Baumol, 2002; Cefis & Marsili, 2005; Schumpeter, 2008) and also for FinTechs
(Nicoletti, 2017) in particular and are therefore effective signals. With the help of good
and new ideas, nascent firms are able to enter markets. Furthermore, in a valuation
context, innovative firms often profit from an “innovation premium” (Cefis & Marsili,
2005, p. 1188). Recent studies have shown a positive relationship between the probability
of survival and the number of patents and pending applications (Bollazzi et al., 2018;
Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016; Silverman & Baum, 2002). Patents also help to acquire
capital from investors (Munari & Toschi, 2015). Patents help in providing information
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about the maturity and the positioning of the firm (Cohen & Lemley, 2001) as well as
serve as a protection of own ideas (Ahlers et al., 2015).
Next to patents, winning awards or being granted subsidies are also signals of
the success of a firm. Usually, a prerequisite for winning an award or obtaining subsidies
is a structured evaluation of the business idea and business plan. Often entrepreneurs
need to apply for awards and subsidies and are at the same time in competition with
others. Such signals are investigated, for instance, by Islam et al. (2018) who analyze the
signaling effect of received governmental grants and find a positive relationship to the
funding success. Thus, both patents and subsidies can serve as signals to indicate
intellectual capital and are meeting the criteria of observable and costly as required for
effective signals.
Hypothesis 2: FinTechs with more intellectual capital (i.e. obtained subsidies
and granted patents) are likely to have a larger financing capacity.
3.

Social Alliance/Network Capital

Start-ups face multiple opportunities and constraints in their first years. Alliances
and personal networks provide the ability to manipulate those opportunities and
constraints (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Alliances are also an important source to gain
access to further resources (e.g. Baum & Silverman, 2004; Chung et al., 2000; Klus et al.,
2019). Often these alternative channels can be used to gain insights on particular topics.
There is vast literature regarding benefits and effects of alliances (e.g. Baum & Oliver,
1991; Chung et al., 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998). According to Brüderl and Preisendörfer
(1998) networks can facilitate access to suppliers, customers, financial resources, etc.
In the early stages of new ventures, venture capitalists play a pivotal role as they
can offer coaching and consulting services as well as provide access to further resources.
Besides professional investors, nowadays social networks also play a critical role. Social
networking facilitates the exchange and knowledge sharing between and amongst
founders whilst bringing entrepreneurs and potential customers together (Hsu, 2007;
Nicoletti, 2017; Shane & Cable, 2002; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). When entrepreneurs
are able to effectively use their personal social networks, they are also able to improve
their access to additional resources (Ferrary & Granovetter, 2009; Mollick, 2014).
Access to valuable resources is also facilitated by the location of the start-up.
Start-ups residing in “FinTech-Hot-spots” might be able to build up a network or an
alliance with other founders and supporters more easily. Therefore, the location serves
as a signal for the social alliance/network capital.
Hypothesis 3: FinTechs with more social alliance/network capital (i.e.
Facebook likes, twitter followers, located in hot spots and cooperating with a partner)
are likely to have a larger financing capacity.
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Strategic Orientation

Before setting up a business, the founders need to make strategic decisions to
implement their ideas. One very important landmark criterion is the business model.
Start-ups need to make clear how they want to set-up their business and want to earn
money, thus the underlying decision inevitably impacts the prospects of start-ups and is
the strategic orientation of a FinTech. Many studies have focused on the effect of the
strategic positioning on funding (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Rassenfosse &
Fischer, 2016; Shepherd, 1999). In such studies, different elements regarding the strategic
position, including the business model have been investigated.
“A business model articulates the logic and provides data and other evidence that
demonstrates how a business creates and delivers value to customers” (Teece, 2010, p.
173). The configuration of the business model is one of the most important steps in
setting up a business (Nicoletti, 2017; Trimi & Berbegal-Mirabent, 2012). It is a crucial
aspect regarding the further prospects of a company and is related with its performance.
This is also exemplified by Zott and Amit (2007) who found a positive relationship
between novelty-centered business models and the performance of start-ups. According
to Johnson et al. (2008), a business model consists of the following four elements: the
customer value proposition, profit formula, key resources and key processes.
We extend current literature and evaluate how the strategic orientation in terms
of the business model pattern of a FinTech influences its funding success. Therefore, we
employ an explorative study for the business model patterns. We argue that some of
these business model patterns are more attractive for external investors than others. For
example, directly earning money with a pay-per-use model might be more attractive than
a freemium model, which requires users to develop from the free version to the paid
version.
Hypothesis 4: The strategic orientation of a FinTech (i.e. the choice of business
model pattern) affects the funding capacity.
C.
Acquisition of External Funding for FinTechs
The acquisition of financial resources is very important for start-ups. Especially
in the initial phase, young firms are facing different challenges due to their maturity level.
The first source of financing is usually self-funding through either the founders and the
team themselves, relatives (families and friends) or (professional) angel investors
(Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016). According to Berger and Udell (1995), these sources of
insider financing are essential in the first stages since information asymmetries are at a
maximum. Insider financing is also often a necessary condition to generate further
funding as it reduces the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Berger &
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Udell, 1995). When generating further funding, founders can rely on both debt and
equity. In both cases, the investors must be convinced of the positive prospects of the
business as well as its ability to repay or generate an adequate return. For entrepreneurial
science it is important to analyze what makes investors invest money in a start-up and
what are their decision-making criteria. The decision process and the criteria of venture
capitalists has been widely studied in literature. Venture capitalists use different criteria
that also depend on the maturity level and the evaluation stage1 of a start-up (Fried &
Hisrich, 1994; Hall & Hofer, 1993; Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016). Individual and venture
capitalists’ specific criteria include, for instance, accordance to investment guidelines as
well as personal fit (Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990). Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016) propose
and determine three parent decision criteria: strategic positioning, quality of the team
and probability of success. Strategic positioning includes different factors such as market,
competition, capital intensity of the business model and timing (Lieberman &
Montgomery, 1988; Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016; Shepherd, 1999). Those factors impact
the probability of survival and are also critical in the decision-making process. In the
following, we translate strategic positioning into business model pattern and area of
activity. Furthermore, the quality of the team is another critical evaluation criteria that
has been widely studied in literature (e.g. Colombo et al., 2004; Macmillan et al., 1985;
Silverman & Baum, 2002; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). The probability of success also
appears as a key factor in the evaluation process, and investors usually spend a lot of
time trying to determine this probability (Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016). However, since
nascent businesses are highly opaque, investors often rely on different signals. Those
signals need to be observable but are costly to acquire (Spence, 1973) and also correlated
with the probability of success. The signals studied to date include the quality of the
team, the intellectual capital or the social alliance capital (e.g. Ahlers et al., 2015; Baum
& Silverman, 2004; Hoenig & Henkel, 2015; Hsu, 2007).
III.
Data and Method
A.
Data Set Construction and Sample
To evaluate different signals of a FinTech that have a positive or negative impact
on the financing capacity of FinTechs, we use a quantitative-empirical approach. This
method, based on a large dataset, allows us to verify various characteristics of these
companies according to their suitability as efficient signals.
We generated our own database of FinTechs by using a wide range of data
sources. To begin with, we provided a detailed definition of a FinTech by focusing on

1

Fried and Hisrich (1994) propose a six-stage decision making process.
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three key characteristics: business segment, founding year and location. Start-ups that
offer services in the financial industry by using new technologies were considered.
Furthermore, the considered start-ups needed to be founded after January 1st, 2007 and
operate in Germany.2 The German market is very dynamic and marked by a very
attractive environment for start-ups. Data collection was finished in October 2017.
To identify FinTechs complying with our above-mentioned restrictions, we used
three different data sources: crunchbase, Gruenderszene as well as "Payment and
banking" to obtain a sample of the German market. 3 Using these different data sources,
we have created a list of FinTechs that comply with the definition stated above. A
database was then set up which was used to collect all relevant and required information.
The built-up database contains relevant general information about all the FinTechs (e.g.
location, founding year, founders and number of employees), information about the
funding (e.g. funding volume per funding round, date of the funding round) as well as
information on the business model pattern and the area of activity. From the abovementioned sources as well as the webpages of the FinTechs, we derived the individual
characteristics and business model patterns per FinTech. Since the mapping of the
business model pattern is essential as one part of the analysis of the financing capacity,
all FinTech companies were analyzed by two persons independently. Both coders have
deep knowledge of the FinTech market as well as comprehensive knowledge on business
models and areas of activity.4 In order to validate and measure the quality of the mapping,
the inter-coder reliability was calculated. Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) describe and
analyze different measures of the inter-coder reliability. One measure to describe the
agreement between two coders for nominal data is the percentage agreement (Hayes &
Krippendorff, 2007). A level of agreement of over 90% is generally accepted by
researchers (Neuendorf, 2002). We achieved an inter-coder reliability of 94.6% for
business model patterns and 97.8% for the areas of activity. Thus, the required level was
exceeded. In order to achieve a final mapping, we performed a joint verification to
discuss and correct mistakes and different perceptions. The data acquisition was finalized
at the end of March 2018 which resulted in the database including 101 FinTechs with
funding information.

One can state that the FinTech hype started to emerge around 2007.
See www.crunchbase.com, www.gruenderszene.de and www.paymentandbanking.com.
4 Coding was done by the authors of this paper who have both scientific and practical experience in the
Financial Services industry as well as experience in the field of business models and areas of activities.
2
3
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Measures
Dependent Variable

We operationalized the financing capacity of a FinTech, our dependent variable,
as the generated total funding volume (i.e. the financing capacity). The funding volume
reflects how much money a company can attract from investors. As a rule, high
investment volumes are a sign of investors’ confidence in start-up performance and
prospect. Nevertheless, a high funding amount does not necessarily imply business
success, but from the point of view of the investors the business concept seems to be a
promising approach.
2.

Independent Variables

We also need to operationalize the independent variables, i.e. the signals that are
supposed to have an impact on the financing capacity of the FinTechs.
Human Capital. We obtained comprehensive data about the founders of each
FinTech in order to reflect and estimate human capital. We collected information on the
number of founders, the individual work experience of the founders, and the education.
The number of founders was split in three categories: one founder, two or three
founders and more than 4 founders (each measured by a binary 0/1 variable). The size
of the team has two different effects. On the one hand, in larger teams, tasks can be
shared, and knowledge and capabilities can be complemented. On the other hand, larger
teams complicate decision processes and require more internal coordination.
Work experience is the second indicator for human capital and was measured via
the pure work experience in years (1-2 years, 2-5 years and more than 5 years) as well as
the work experience with start-ups (all reflected by a binary 0/1 variable).
Furthermore, another important signal is the education (Backes-Gellner
& Werner, 2007; Levie & Gimmon, 2008). Therefore, we evaluated how many team
members have a university degree (Bachelor, Master, and Diploma), an advanced
university degree (Dr., Ph.D.) or an MBA.
Intellectual capital. For estimating the effect of intellectual capital, we used two
different binary variables (1 = yes, 0 = no) including granted awards/subsidies and
applications for/or granted patents. We follow recent research from Islam et al. (2014)
and Islam et al. (2018) and use granted awards, e.g. EXIST-Gruenderstipendium, as an
indicator of intellectual capital. In order to win an award, start-ups usually must apply in
advance and meet various requirements. The application is usually checked by experts.
Accordingly, a start-up is subjected to a kind of quality test. The use of patents as an
indicator of intellectual capital is common across literature (Ahlers et al., 2015; Baum
& Silverman, 2004; Conti et al., 2013a; Conti et al. 2013b; Häussler et al., 2009; Silverman
& Baum, 2002). On the one hand, patents reflect innovation through the development
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of new technologies and on the other hand serve as a protection of ideas. We follow
those previous analyses and, in detail, use a binary 0/1 variable to assess whether a
FinTech either possesses or applied for a patent.
Social alliance/network capital. Network capital and human capital are often
related and are mutually dependent. We measure the social alliance/network capital in
two segments: (1) professional alliances and (2) social networks. At first, we assess
whether a FinTech is cooperating with a partner. A partner can have a twofold effect in
that it can help FinTechs to get access to further resources, but may also be an obstacle
for investors since, depending on the partnership, they must also deal with the partner.
Furthermore, we also take the location of the FinTech as another indicator, since hot
spots are cities that offer good conditions and a fertile environment for start-ups. We
define the cities Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich as hot spots. The city or region can serve
as an accelerator. In general, cities or regions offer different framework conditions that
can have a positive or negative impact on the development of the start-ups. Hot spots
are characterized by many FinTechs, an attractiveness for young talents, established
networks, favorable business space, proximity to investors or partners, etc. In our
research we use a dummy variable if a FinTech is placed in a hot spot (1) or not (0).
Presence in social media as well as feedback from the users, e.g. through a “like”
function nowadays is a standard and gives access to many customers (Bi et al., 2017;
Jiménez & Mendoza, 2013). For our analysis, we operationalize the social network effect
by the variables "Twitter followers" and "Facebook likes". Users of social networks that
“like” or “follow” a firm, receive all updates from them and can also react and give
feedback, ask questions or share requests, e.g. job advertisements. Thus, FinTechs can
draw attention to marketing campaigns or can acquire resources with the help of the
crowd.
Strategic orientation. To capture the firm’s strategic orientation, we use the
business model patterns of each FinTech. Such patterns are based on similarities between
the single elements of a business model. While Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) develop
a scheme of five different patterns, Gassmann et al. (2013) provide an extensive overview
of 55 different business model patterns, which cover a wide range of different industries.
In our study, we use the patterns of Gassmann et al. (2013)5 and assign each FinTech to
these various categories. In this way, we can consider the strategic decision of the
business model and its signaling value in our analysis of the financing capacity. The

For an overview of the various business model patterns and its definitions, see Gassmann et al. (2013),
p. 94ff.
5
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business model pattern is coded for all FinTechs, whereby each pattern is defined as a
dummy variable (0 = no, 1 = yes).
3.

Control Variables

In order to consider further effects that may have an impact on the funding
process, we use five different control variables. First, we control for the size of the
FinTech by the number of its employees. The size of a company reflects the maturity of
a company and is a measure for already required funding. A small number of employees
is often related to a very young company that is currently being in its set up phase. The
number of employees is classified into 5 different clusters: 1 to 10, 11 to 50, 51 to 100,
101 to 250, >250. Secondly, we control for the activity period, i.e. how many years the
FinTech has been operating in the market, to account for possible unobserved
heterogeneity between the different FinTechs. Thirdly, we also control for the industry
(area of activity), since different segments of the financial services industry require
different amounts of funding. Establishing a completely new bank or insurance company
requires much more capital than setting up a crowdfunding platform or a comparison
portal. For the area of activity, we use the typology of Stuckenborg et al. (2017) in our
study and differentiate between 13 categories.
Fourthly, we also consider the share of female founders since studies have shown
that female founders have an impact on the funding (e.g. Marom et al., 2014). Finally,
we control for the number of funding rounds that were necessary to generate the
funding.
IV.
Results
In order to investigate the signals of venture quality in accordance with the
financing capacity, we apply a two-step approach. We start with a descriptive data
analysis to provide an overview of our database and the characteristics of the German
FinTech market. Thus, we set the theoretical backdrop to determine the right variables
for the regression (Stock & Watson, 2012). A regression analysis is then applied to
further identify and quantify the correlations between the variables and the funding
success. The individual factors can be assessed using a regression analysis (it should be
noted, though, that the individual variables have different scale levels). We will test the
specified model on heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity and, if necessary, a robust
regression will be used (Greene, 2012).
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Hot or Not Hot

A.
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in table 1. The mean
(median) total funding of the sample FinTechs was EUR 16 m (2.5 m).
As expected, when analyzing FinTechs, the firm size measured by the number
of employees is relatively small in our sample. The largest part of the included start-ups
shows an employee range of up to 50. The activity period of the FinTechs is at least two
years, since it often takes some time to generate financing capacity and go for the first
funding. As shown in the previous sections, start-ups rely on capital provided by relatives
(or the founders themselves) in the early-stages.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Obs.
Total funding
No. Funding rounds
Activity period
Share of female founders
Emp. Range 1-10
Emp. Range 11-50
Emp. Range 51-100
Emp. Range 101-250
Emp. Range >250
AA - Asset/Investment Mgmt.
AA - Banking Services
AA - Blockchain
AA - Comparison Portals
AA - Crowdfinancing
AA - Data Management
AA - Insurance
AA - Intermediaries
AA - Payment

101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101

No. Founder 1
No. Founders 2-3
No. Founders 4-5
Work experience >2y
Work experience >5y
Work experience start-up
Edu share 1 (Univ. Degree)
Edu share 2 (PhD, MBA)

101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101

Twitter followers
Facebook Likes
Hot spot
Partners

101
101
101
101

Patents
Awards/Subsidies

101
101

BM - Add on
BM - Digitalization
BM - Flatrate
BM - Freemium

101
101
101
101

Mean

Median
Std. dev.
Control Variables
16,031,386.0754
2,500,000.0000
49,043,484.0407
2.6634
2.0000
1.8181
5.0000
4.0000
2.1541
0.0314
0.0000
0.1540
0.2475
0.0000
0.4337
0.4554
0.0000
0.5005
0.1881
0.0000
0.3928
0.0495
0.0000
0.2180
0.0594
0.0000
0.2376
0.2178
0.0000
0.4148
0.1782
0.0000
0.3846
0.0396
0.0000
0.1960
0.1089
0.0000
0.3131
0.1089
0.0000
0.3131
0.1386
0.0000
0.3473
0.0297
0.0000
0.1706
0.2574
0.0000
0.4394
0.2970
0.0000
0.4592
Venture Quality - Human Capital
0.1881
0.0000
0.3928
0.6535
1.0000
0.4782
0.1584
0.0000
0.3670
0.9802
1.0000
0.1400
0.8317
1.0000
0.3760
0.4752
0.0000
0.5019
0.8528
1.0000
0.2631
0.2398
0.0000
0.3447
Venture Quality - Social Alliance/Network Capital
1,374.9208
553.0000
3,286.9823
12,683.8614
1,247.0000
62,121.9366
0.6931
1.0000
0.4635
0.5149
1.0000
0.5023
Venture Quality - Intellectual Capital
0.0693
0.0000
0.2552
0.0990
0.0000
0.3002
Venture Quality - Strategic Orientation
0.1089
0.0000
0.3131
0.1782
0.0000
0.3846
0.1188
0.0000
0.3252
0.1485
0.0000
0.3574

Min.

Max.

2,500.0000
1.0000
2.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

432,109,188.0000
13.0000
11.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

25,900.0000
537,579.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.0000
0.0000

1.0000
1.0000

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
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BM - Layer Player
101
0.3564
BM - Pay per Use
101
0.3366
BM - Peer to peer
101
0.2475
BM - Performance-based
101
0.0990
Contracting
BM - 2-sided market
101
0.1881
BM - White Label
101
0.1089
AA = Area of activity; BM = Business model pattern
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0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.4813
0.4749
0.4337

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

0.0000

0.3002

0.0000

1.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.3928
0.3131

0.0000
0.0000

1.0000
1.0000
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Table 2. Correlation matrix (Pearson).
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Total funding
No. Founder 1
No. Founders 2-3
No. Founders 4-5
Work exp. >5y
Work exp. start-up
Edu share 1
Edu share 2
Twitter followers
FB Likes
Awards/Subsidies
Patent
Hot spot
Partners
BM – Add on
BM - Digitalization
BM - Flatrate
BM - Freemium
BM - Layer Player
BM - Pay per Use
BM - Peer to peer
BM - Perf.-ba. Contr.
BM - 2-sided market
BM - White Label
AA - Asset/Inv. Mgmt.
AA - Banking Services
AA - Blockchain
AA – Comp. Portals
AA - Crowdfinancing
AA - Data Mgmt.
AA - Insurance
AA - Intermediaries
AA - Payment
Emp. Range 1-10
Emp. Range 11-50
Emp. Range 51-100
Emp. Range 101-250
Emp. Range >250
No. Funding rounds
Activity period
Share fem. founders

2

3

4

1
-0.098 1
0.100 -,661** 1
-0.026 -,209* -,596** 1
-0.138 -0.190 0.173 -0.022
0.132 -,204* 0.068 0.130
0.043 0.077 -0.036 -0.036
-0.013 0.107 -0.101 0.017
0.113 -0.134 0.112 -0.002
0.122 -0.080 -0.062 0.167
-0.063 0.010 0.032 -0.053
,283** -0.131 0.117 -0.012
-0.143 -0.064 0.012 0.054
-0.070 -0.090 0.042 0.041
-0.098 0.157 -0.079 -0.065
0.066 0.107 -0.041 -0.060
-0.043 -0.020 0.010 0.008
-0.079 -0.059 0.187 -0.181
-0.082 0.065 -,197* 0.187
0.074 -0.021 -0.098 0.150
0.004 -0.041 0.032 0.002
-0.070 -0.160 -0.107 ,310**
-0.047 -0.167 0.084 0.069
-0.042 -0.168 0.188 -0.065
0.030 0.114 -0.120 0.034
,272** -0.092 0.122 -0.060
-0.057 0.032 -0.065 0.051
0.044 -0.087 0.188 -0.152
0.114 -0.087 0.054 0.022
-0.075 0.027 -0.069 0.061
-0.020 ,214* -0.118 -0.076
-0.059 0.006 0.048 -0.069
-0.124 -0.036 -0.028 0.074
-0.183 0.135 -0.016 -0.123
-,201* 0.119 -0.002 -0.125
0.015 -,232* -0.022 ,277**
,257** -0.110 0.166 -0.099
,497** -0.014 -0.081 0.120
,665** -0.106 0.049 0.051
,238* 0.012 0.010 -0.025
-0.059 ,232* -0.123 -0.089

5

6

1
,269**
-0.051
0.064
0.045
0.069
-0.117
-0.086
0.045
0.146
-0.013
0.002
0.002
-0.035
-0.052
0.040
-0.049
-0.028
-0.054
0.072
0.173
0.140
-0.180
-0.013
-0.013
0.027
-,233*
-0.159
0.003
-0.171
0.093
0.081
-0.019
0.001
0.004
-0.049
-0.167

1
0.103
0.075
0.019
0.136
-0.183
,209*
0.031
0.130
0.113
0.023
-0.043
-0.007
0.078
-0.049
-0.040
-0.116
0.049
0.049
-0.118
0.075
0.010
-0.014
-0.078
0.020
-0.050
-0.062
0.119
-0.178
0.125
-0.103
0.148
0.096
0.122
-0.139
-0.152

7

8

1
,299** 1
0.087 0.052
0.015 0.096
0.123 -0.055
-0.132 -0.087
0.063 -0.015
0.024 0.136
0.075 -0.037
0.023 0.152
-0.183 -0.019
0.058 -,211*
0.001 ,227*
-0.129 -0.062
-0.050 -0.100
-0.088 -0.121
-0.125 -0.023
-0.026 -0.013
0.037 0.166
0.171 -0.143
0.066 -0.043
-0.026 0.080
-0.006 -0.121
0.007 0.019
0.024 0.104
0.050 0.183
-,237* -0.045
-0.160 -0.128
0.160 0.026
-0.004 0.051
-0.104 0.040
0.056 0.056
0.001 -0.052
-,266** -0.177
0.053 0.134

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

1
0.148
,204*
-0.071
0.031
-0.016
0.071
,244*
0.121
0.147
-0.085
-0.089
-0.084
0.038
-0.028
-0.071
-0.079
0.134
0.004
-0.066
-0.008
0.166
-0.071
-0.127
-0.076
-0.168
-0.132
0.139
-0.033
,384**
0.171
0.036
-0.058

1
0.009
-0.036
0.106
-0.052
-0.054
-0.031
-0.058
-0.022
0.145
0.179
-0.066
-0.038
-0.067
-0.061
-0.071
-0.030
-0.036
-0.064
-0.016
-0.062
-0.026
-0.102
0.182
-0.109
-0.143
-0.069
,229*
,403**
,270**
0.097
-0.041

1
-0.090
-,211*
-0.010
0.097
-0.068
-0.019
0.141
0.099
0.044
0.040
0.112
-0.160
-0.116
0.066
-0.068
-0.067
-0.116
0.097
-0.133
-0.058
-0.195
0.147
0.040
-0.037
0.010
-0.076
0.057
-0.067
0.186
-0.068

1
0.013
-0.047
0.030
-0.025
0.020
0.105
-0.122
0.053
0.024
-0.090
-0.032
0.030
-0.144
0.077
-0.055
-0.095
-0.095
-0.109
0.182
0.107
-0.007
,205*
-0.171
-0.131
0.117
0.096
0.180
0.000
-0.056

1
0.127
-0.043
0.029
-0.154
-0.145
-0.087
0.156
-0.016
0.149
-0.009
-0.043
-0.013
0.029
0.025
-,250*
0.026
-0.044
-0.010
-0.001
0.010
-,215*
0.178
0.046
-0.046
-0.014
0.090
-0.110
-0.074

1
0.021
-0.066
0.050
-0.152
-0.022
-0.021
0.190
0.189
-0.040
-0.042
0.176
-0.066
-,209*
0.149
0.085
-0.127
0.053
0.118
0.111
-0.132
0.013
0.062
0.130
-0.007
0.104
0.074
-,211*

1
0.086
-0.030
,301**
-0.061
0.020
0.020
-0.009
-0.168
-0.122
0.124
0.003
-0.071
-0.122
-0.122
0.136
-0.061
-,206*
0.051
0.094
0.063
-0.087
-0.080
-0.088
-0.058
-0.044
-0.072

1
0.069
-0.122
-0.076
-0.167
-0.147
-0.154
0.107
-0.080
-0.058
0.189
0.171
0.169
-0.080
0.038
,223*
0.081
-0.189
0.033
-0.062
-0.026
0.013
0.102
0.001
-0.133
-0.095

1
-0.067
-,209*
0.062
-0.069
-0.019
-0.020
-0.128
0.029
0.069
-0.075
0.068
-0.128
0.030
-0.064
-0.006
0.029
0.073
-0.090
0.136
-0.084
-0.092
-0.016
0.043
0.025

1
-0.136
-0.180
0.019
-0.138
-0.130
-0.057
0.049
0.169
-0.085
-0.057
-0.146
0.074
-0.073
-0.182
0.094
0.148
0.009
-,201*
0.033
0.013
-0.061
0.091
-0.085

19

20

1
-0.005 1
-,283** -0.117
-0.039 -0.096
0.065 -0.021
0.005 -,249*
-,242* 0.081
-,293** 0.106
-0.151 -0.037
0.072 -,249*
-,260** 0.087
0.120 -0.164
-0.008 -0.125
0.129 -0.132
,331** ,225*
-0.092 -0.020
-0.016 0.022
0.065 0.032
0.021 -0.066
0.075 -0.002
-0.079 0.040
0.096 -0.137
0.118 0.059

21

22

1
-0.037
0.135
0.020
0.031
-0.027
0.119
0.094
,462**
-0.164
-0.100
0.030
-0.072
-0.010
0.028
0.017
-0.025
-0.047
-0.058
0.021
-0.067

1
0.010
0.097
0.146
-0.154
-0.067
-0.116
0.097
-0.037
-0.058
-0.044
-0.070
-0.037
0.030
0.010
-0.076
0.057
0.098
0.186
-0.068

23

24

1
-0.006 1
-0.070 -0.107
-0.092 -0.080
-0.098 0.092
,238* -0.020
,238* 0.082
0.100 -0.048
0.065 0.126
,238* 0.012
-,257** 0.051
0.076 0.094
-0.084 -0.128
0.092 -0.006
-0.110 ,213*
-0.014 -0.088
-0.050 -0.005
-0.142 0.074
0.067 -0.002

25

26

1
-0.183 1
-0.107 0.038
-0.030 -0.080
0.047 0.003
-,212* -0.037
-0.092 -0.081
-0.091 -0.156
-,291** -0.076
-0.025 -0.027
0.047 0.042
-0.009 -0.092
-0.010 -0.106
-0.031 ,211*
-0.048 ,230*
0.078 -0.048
-0.108 -0.095

27

1
-0.071
0.092
-0.081
-0.036
-0.003
-0.021
0.119
0.018
-0.098
-0.046
-0.051
-0.103
-0.095
0.069

28

29

1
-0.020 1
-0.048 -0.140
-0.061 -0.061
,376** -0.060
-,227* -0.158
0.020 -0.127
-0.128 0.063
-0.006 -0.006
0.067 0.067
0.181 0.047
0.047 -0.058
0.015 0.104
-0.072 -0.072

30

31

1
-0.070
0.091
-0.135
-,230*
,208*
0.100
-0.092
-0.101
0.106
0.027
-0.020

1
0.164
-0.114
0.170
-0.160
-0.084
,229*
-0.044
0.000
-0.109
,345**

32

33

1
-,333** 1
-0.023 0.079
0.053 -0.072
-0.052 0.020
0.074 0.051
-0.052 -0.072
-0.053 0.001
-0.116 0.131
-0.120 -0.062

34

35

36

1
-,525** 1
-,276** -,440** 1
-0.131 -,209* -0.110
-0.144 -,230* -0.121
-,350** -0.192 ,216*
-0.161 -0.148 0.106
0.107 -0.014 -0.043

37

38

1
-0.057
,219*
,213*
-0.047

1
,487**
,235*
-0.051

Notes: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) / ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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40

*
1
,281** 1
-0.152 -0.116 1
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Most FinTechs (65.5%) have been founded by 2 or 3 people, which indicates
that most founders prefer this team size as it seems to be a good tradeoff between
diversification and coordination efforts. In most of the founding teams (83.2%), at least
one founder has work experience of more than five years. Thus, founders often generate
some working experience before establishing a new business. This might also be helpful
in terms of capital, since after some years in a job, people often have some financial
resources that help initiate a new business. Regarding the education, it should be noted
that about 85% of the founders have an academic degree (Bachelor, Master or Diploma),
while almost 24% even have a PhD or an MBA. In terms of network activity, the
FinTechs are more prominent on Facebook pages (measured in terms of likes) than on
Twitter. Most FinTechs are located in Hot spots and more than 50% have a partner with
whom they are cooperating.
Most FinTechs operate with the business model pattern layer player (35.6%) and
pay per use (33.7%). Of particular interest are business model patterns that already give
a hint on the way FinTechs are earning money. Patterns such as flat rate (11.9%) generate
constant revenue streams (depending on the number of users), whereas pay per use
indicates a direct relationship between performance and profit. However, with freemium,
users must be first convinced to switch from services free of charge to paid services.
The correlation matrix (table 2) show several significances and thus, we employ
multivariate analyses to validate our hypotheses.
B.
Multivariate analysis
For investigating the effect of venture quality on the financing capacity, we
provide several regression models. To capture the financing capacity, we use the
dependent variable of total funding. We conduct three regression models to investigate
the individual effects of (1) human, social network/alliance and intellectual capital as
classical signals of venture quality, (2) strategic orientation as new signal and (3) an all-in
model (full model).
Table 3 provides the results of the OLS regression with robust standard errors
between the dependent variable total funding and the independent as well as the control
variables. Both the models for the individual effects and the model containing all
variables show several significant coefficients providing empirical evidence for the
different signals analyzed.
Table 3. OLS-Regression with robust standard errors for total funding.
Dependent variable:
Total Funding (EUR m)
Classic Signals (1)

Strat Orientation (2)

Full Model (3)

Copyright © 2015 Pepperdine Digital Commons and the Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance.
All rights reserved. ISSN: 2373-1761.
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Constant
No. Founders 2-3
No. Founders 4-5
Work Experience >5y
Work Experience Start-up
Edu share 1 (Univ. degree)
Edu share 2 (PhD, MBA)
Twitter followers (in thousand)
FB Likes (in thousand)
Hot spot
Partners
Awards/Subsidies
Patent
BM - Add on
BM - Digitalization
BM - Flatrate
BM - Freemium
BM - Layer Player
BM - Pay per Use
BM - Peer to peer
BM - Perform.-based Contract.
BM - 2-sided market
BM - White Label
AA - Asset/Investment
Mgmt.
AA - Banking Services
AA - Blockchain
AA - Comparison Portals
AA - Crowdfinancing
AA - Data Management
AA - Insurance
AA - Intermediaries
AA - Payment
Emp. Range 1-10
Emp. Range 11-50
Emp. Range 51-100
Emp. Range 101-250
Activity period
Share of female founders
No. Funding rounds
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
VIF
Durbin Watson Test
Breusch-Pagan Test

Everett & Fairchild

A Theory of Entrepreneurial Overconfidence

69.04* (41.01)
1.78 (29.09)
Venture Quality – Human Capital
8.87 (6.97)
-2.68 (9.72)
-27.75** (11.61)
7.56 (5.43)
5.17 (11.12)
8.97 (7.02)
Venture Quality – Social Alliance/Network Capital
-0.84 (0.85)
-0.11* (0.07)
-21.39** (9.41)
-11.97** (5.47)
Venture Quality – Intellectual Capital
-18.23** (8.50)
20.15 (16.64)
Venture Quality – Strategic Orientation
-4.45 (7.28)
6.42 (7.62)
0.45 (8.85)
-11.05 (8.34)
8.60 (6.82)
-0.67 (6.96)
0.42 (5.92)
-27.52* (14.45)
-6.67 (6.93)
-6.32 (9.51)
Controls

41.81 (35.23)
20.87*** (7.06)
7.27 (9.25)
-30.34*** (11.25)
8.80* (5.24)
13.80 (9.06)
-0.76 (7.19)
-0.20 (0.80)
-0.14** (0.06)
-23.35*** (8.57)
-13.39*** (4.81)
-24.14*** (8.97)
18.42 (14.85)
-9.22 (7.59)
14.35** (6.76)
-4.93 (7.67)
-22.69*** (8.55)
10.16 (6.29)
5.09 (6.50)
6.78 (6.14)
-14.51 (10.43)
-13.13* (7.08)
-13.50 (9.53)

11.11 (9.24)

4.23 (8.74)

17.52* (9.36)

13.16 (9.25)
-16.34 (11.95)
-19.60 (13.47)
19.79** (9.95)
-12.27 (9.44)
-35.05 (22.60)
-3.02 (6.02)
-6.40 (7.71)
-64.06** (31.32)
-63.03** (31.42)
-60.26* (32.83)
-21.45 (35.37)
-0.06 (1.70)
8.22 (17.29)
13.81*** (4.72)
101
0.70
0.58
33.33 (df = 72)
5.05*** (df = 28; 72)
3.34
2.31
74.36***

10.85 (9.12)
-12.98 (13.78)
-15.12 (9.42)
21.89* (12.01)
-12.75 (10.65)
-36.04** (15.84)
-1.86 (6.18)
-19.22* (11.57)
-19.49 (23.57)
-33.86 (22.58)
-41.41 (25.46)
1.36 (34.69)
1.18 (1.48)
20.79 (13.89)
16.62** (7.93)
101
0.61
0.47
35.69 (df = 74)
3.09*** (df = 26; 74)
2.55
1.80
56.78***

9.93 (9.27)
-29.88* (15.30)
-23.32* (12.56)
21.18** (10.08)
-7.86 (7.90)
-35.48* (18.19)
-5.73 (6.45)
-8.16 (8.93)
-46.21 (28.85)
-53.63* (29.16)
-58.38* (30.06)
-15.56 (29.81)
1.10 (1.42)
9.75 (17.32)
14.85*** (4.29)
101
0.76
0.61
30.80 (df = 62)
6.26*** (df = 38; 62)
4.09
2.29
74.65***
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Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. A Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation and a Breusch-Pagan Test for
heteroskedasticity were performed for each model. Due to heteroskedasticity in all models, following (White, 1980),
we used robust standard errors for each regression. (Robust standard errors in parenthesis.) Furthermore, we
calculated for each regression analysis the variance inflation factor (VIF) to ensure that our results are not influenced
by multicollinearity. The results show a VIF of 4.09 for the full model and 3.34 and 2.55 for the classic and strategic
model respectively; a VIF up to 10 is generally said acceptable (Jacob Cohen, 2010). In order to test the linear
specification of the full model, we applied the RESET test (Ramsey, 1969), which confirmed our model specification
(F=1.27, df1 = 38, df2 = 24, p-value = 0.27).

Corresponding with other studies, we hypothesized a positive relation between
the human capital and the funding success. Regarding the number of founders, the full
model indicates a positive and significant relationship with the total funding for a team
size of 2-3 founders, which seems to be optimal from the point of view of investors. We
argue that this number is a consequence of the tradeoff between a higher degree of
coordination in large teams and the presence of synergies from different competencies.
Another important component of the human capital is the founders’ experience. For this
aspect, our results show a varied response. While general work experience larger than
five years results in a negative relation, the variable for experience in the start-up
environment reveals a positive association with the financing capacity (in the full model).
According to these results, work experience greater than five years appears to be
unattractive for investors. As a possible explanation, we propose that the ways of
thinking and working are already settled with the founders and they may be less
susceptible for suggestions and guidelines made by external investors. It may also be
deduced that founders with an established and proven work experience are less
dependent on external capital, since they are in a better position to provide their own
financial resources for the early years which also enables them to keep a greater share of
their business. In contrast, investors appreciate experience made in a start-up
environment, indicated by the positive relationship of the variable “start-up experience”.
Such founders know the peculiarities of the business in young ventures and seem to
generate more trust by investors. Overall, the experience of founders has an influence
on the funding success. However, it must be stated in a more differentiated way. Further
to this, the impact of the educational background of the founders was analyzed. While
the respective coefficients show no significant relationship to the funding success, the
signs are positive for university degrees and negative for MBA or PhD degrees. Despite
their insignificance, we presume that higher university degrees are not attractive for
investors. In summation, our hypothesis concerning human capital can be confirmed.
Human capital serves as signal of venture quality measured via the funding success. But
in contrast to other studies, the impact of working experience is not necessarily positive
by investigating the generated funding volume.
The variables for the social alliance/network capital, Partner, hot spot and
number of FB likes, show negative and significant coefficients, indicating a negative
association between the funding success and the social alliance/network capital. Our
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results are in contrast to the results of other studies (e.g. Baum & Silverman, 2004) which
leads us to reject our hypothesis of a positive relationship. Although at first glance the
results are astonishing, we can conclude that partners have, from the viewpoint of an
investor, not a positive impact, since investors dread the conflict with other stakeholders
of the FinTech. This might be of relevance if the partners hold shares. It is also suggested
that start-ups having a large network of partners, do not rely on external capital, since
they are supported by their partners.
Regarding the third dimension of venture quality, the intellectual capital,
measured by subsidy and patent, our results suggest a negative association for subsidy
and awards in contrast to our stated hypothesis. This variable shows negative and
statistically significant coefficients in both the full model and the model measuring the
individual effects. We can explain these findings by the fact, that founders who go
through such an application process might not focus on the main business of their startup and spend much time in gaining such a subsidy. On the other hand, FinTechs
supported by any kind of subsidy need a lower level of external capital in comparison to
other start-ups.
The variable for the intellectual capital (patent) shows a positive but insignificant
coefficient. Similar findings have been provided by Ahlers et al. (2015). Such patents are
a unique feature of a start-up and make it more likely to survive the selection process in
the FinTech area, as shown in other studies (e.g. Baum & Silverman, 2004; Munari &
Toschi, 2015; Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016). Overall, our third hypothesis of a positive
relationship between the funding success and the intellectual capital cannot be confirmed
with our data.
Next, we focus on the strategic orientation, where we include 10 business model
patterns in our investigation. The regression results show statistically significant
coefficients for four (model 2: 1, model 3: 3) of these strategic elements.
The results suggest that business models in which generating a high number of
users is relevant, are less attractive for investors, indicated by a negative sign of the
respective coefficients. Such strategic elements are e.g. Freemium that focuses on free
offerings of basic services or products and comparison portals. However, the business
model digitalization, which aims at digitizing physical products and processes positively
affects the financing capacity. The empirical results provide evidence and also support
previous research (e.g. Shepherd, 1999) that strategic decisions have an impact on the
generated funding and therefore, can serve as effective signals of the funding success.
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Discussion and Contributions

A.
Theoretical Contributions
Our research contributes to the growing literature on entrepreneurial funding
and financing of FinTechs in particular. Recent literature focusses on different elements
of funding of nascent businesses. The making of investment decisions by venture
capitalists is of great interest in research (e.g. Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Hall & Hofer, 1993;
Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016). Moreover, further research
streams focus on signals in venture financing (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Hoenig &
Henkel, 2015; Silverman & Baum, 2002).
Research on signals in funding decisions is emerging, particularly notable is
research on signals such as human capital (Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Ko & McKelvie,
2018; Unger et al., 2011; Zarutskie, 2010) or intellectual capital, often reflected by patents
(Conti at al., 2013a; Häussler et al., 2009), or network capital (Brüderl & Preisendörfer,
1998; Shane & Cable, 2002; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). Many previous studies have only
focused on single signals. For studies that have defined venture quality through more
than one signal, the main three signals considered are human, intellectual and social
alliance capital (Ahlers et al., 2015; Baum & Silverman, 2004). Thus, research evaluating
simultaneous effects of different signals is still emerging. This research contributes to
signaling theory and to entrepreneurial research through analyzing different signals of
venture quality concurrently instead of focusing only on the effects of single signals. We
present evidence of the importance of human capital for the ability to generate funding
for FinTechs. Our results regarding intellectual capital as well as social network/alliance
capital may be contrary to other studies, however, we develop and explore valid
explanations for the direction of the effects. For instance, “partners” as indicator for
network capital, might have a negative impact on the funding volume as they can be an
obstacle for further external investors due to their strong connection with the FinTech.
The analysis of strategic elements and their impact on funding decisions or the
attractiveness of start-ups is very popular in research (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988;
Rassenfosse & Fischer, 2016; Shepherd, 1999). Previous studies have often applied
exploratory research and performed interviews to evaluate decision criteria (Shepherd,
1999). We contribute by delivering empirical evidence from the FinTech market in
Germany regarding the impact of strategic decisions. In order to reflect strategic
orientation, we apply new measures by operationalizing business model patterns. These
patterns are widely accepted in research as strategic elements. We have proven the impact
and importance of strategic decisions on the financing capacity.
As stated above, different signals have been analyzed independently from each
other, but all have been proven to have an impact on the funding. In this sense, we
pioneer in combining and applying the "classical" as well as "strategic" signals on the
German FinTech market. Moreover, we also contribute to an emerging research stream
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that focusses on the evaluation of FinTech markets and we do so by delivering particular
insights on the German FinTech market. This research is the first to develop and analyze
a comprehensive sample of start-ups in the German financial sector.
B.
Practical Implications
Our study is of particular relevance in practice. The results are important for all
market participants, entrepreneurs as well as investors.
Founders can draw valuable insights about which characteristics made FinTechs
successfully raise funding in the past. The study provides evidence that human capital as
well as the strategic orientation of a FinTech serve as a signal of venture quality and
increase the chance of generating funding. Of notable worth are the number of funders,
i.e. the key composition of the founding team as well as previous experience with startups which increase the generated funding of FinTechs. Furthermore, specific business
model patterns have a positive or a negative impact on the funding success which is
valuable information for founders to consider. Founders are able to use the results to
derive an assessment of the current market and competitive situation. In using this
research, entrepreneurs obtain the advantage to choose the right framework conditions
based on our results for their start-up business to increase their chance of funding
success.
The results of this research are also of interest to other players in the financial
industry. This is due to the fact that the research offers the opportunity to identify
potential cooperation partners for new business ideas with a promising future. One is
also able to measure the maturity of a FinTech by considering the indicator of already
generated funding, for security of investment.
C.
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Despite its merits, our analysis leaves us with some open questions. First, the
start-up and the FinTech market is a rapidly changing market and is currently very
popular among venture capital investors. However, these investors often reject
applications for funding and thus only “successful” projects can be analyzed here. Thus,
research should be extended on the selection process itself.
Second, our dataset only reflects FinTechs in the German market and in a certain
time frame. It may be the case that other markets or industries and timeframes may
function in a different way. In addition, some of our generated data is very crude, and
could be collected in more detail, e.g. we do not measure the quality of subsidies or
awards and we also do not assess the quality of work experience and education. Thus,
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the methodology and the research approach would benefit from the need to be extended
on other industries and countries.
From a practical point of view our research suggests which signals might have a
positive effect on funding. However, we focus on an ex post view, where we postulate a
relationship between the FinTech characteristic and the generated funding. In our
research design we primarily employ variables whose validity has already been empirically
confirmed in other studies. In addition, there are other factors that may have an
influence, and which have already been identified in exploratory studies. Examples in the
FinTech area are regulatory knowledge or technological advantages (Werth et al., 2019).
The validity of these signals should be checked in future by further empirical studies. In
addition, we only analyze signals and are understating the quality of applications for
funding. Application documents that are given to potential investors contain a plethora
of information. The personal contact to investors is also critical. However, such
information is scarcely available. Therefore, we recommend that further studies include
the application documents and also focus on the original selection process when
analyzing the attractiveness of FinTechs.
Finally, we cover the strategic orientation through business model patterns,
which in reality form an interaction with the market environment. With the use of the
funding data, we implicitly obtain information about competition and capital
requirements in the market and attempt to explain their impact as stated above.
However, further studies are needed to further incorporate the market and competitive
environment whilst evaluating the implications.
VI.
Conclusion
With consideration of the available literature, this paper is probably the first to
conduct an empirical analysis of different signals, i.e. venture quality and strategic
orientation, on the financing capacity (in terms of generated funding) of German
FinTechs. Building on earlier entrepreneurial research, our study advances the
understanding of the effectiveness of signals and suggests that different FinTechs can
signal their attractiveness and their financing capacity via different means. We have
exploited a large data set of German FinTechs and their generated funding to expand on
previous research on the funding of start-ups. We evaluated which signals impact the
generated funding. The findings indicated that human capital positively impacts the
funding and that there are some business model patterns that impact the generated
funding. An important finding is that the choice of the business model pattern can have
a positive or negative impact. Accordingly, certain business models and areas of activity
can support and reduce the generated funding. Our results emphasize the importance
for start-ups to select and exude the right signals in order to generate funding for the
growth of their business.
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